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The notion of the “psychosomatic” family continues to enjoy uncritical acceptance 
in the absence ofpromised data and despite its dependence on an outmoded view 
of how psychosocial factors are involved in illness. We review the decline of 
psychosomatic models of illness that assume that arousal is the only or primary 
means by which psychosocial factors influence illness. Focusing on brittle dia- 
betes, we note the potential for family theorists to develop more adequate models 
of poor self-care and medical crises as interactional tactics, as dynamic efforts 
to solve problems, define relationships, and influence others, even i f  they are 
costly and self-defeating. I n  an appendix, we note the inadequacy of Rosman 
and Baker’s (1988) reanalyses of the Minuchin, Rosman and Baker (1978) data. 
Like many researchers and clinicians, we read Psychosomatic Families (Minuchin 
e t  al., 1978) with great enthusiasm when it first appeared. We recognized that the data 
presented in the book were preliminary and inconclusive, and that they were not 
provided in a form that allowed independent judgment about how best to interpret them. 
Yet, despite some reservations, we accepted the promissory note that the book seemed 
to offer, and eagerly waited for the full report of the studies of the familial context of 
poorly controlled diabetes. As Minuchin et  al. (1978) assured us at the time, “This report 
is being prepared for publication” (p. 342). 
A decade later, the promised report had not yet been published, and as we conducted 
research and therapy with the families of diabetic children, we were impressed with 
both the limits of the formulation ofthe family’s role in diabetes offered inPsychosomatic 
Families and the uncritical acceptance that the book continued to enjoy. Family thera- 
pists potentially have much to contribute in any comprehensive approach to the treat- 
ment of chronic illness, but we were dismayed by the number of therapists whose model 
of the role of the family in chronic illness was limited to what they had read in Psycho- 
somatic Families. We gave the text a renewed look. The resulting review (Coyne & 
Anderson, 1988) had two aims: 
1. To re-open discussion of a book that has been widely accepted as a convincing 
demonstration of a particular kind of link between family functioning and problems in 
the management of diabetes and, more generally, between family interaction and indi- 
vidual physioloa. We hoped to stimulate family therapists to read it and reflect upon it 
critically with the vantage of the decade that has passed since its publication. 
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2. To remind the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic group of their promise to provide 
a more complete presentation of the data of which they had given only tantalizing 
glimpses in the original book. Neither methods nor data were presented in a way that 
met customary standards for scientific communication. We had hoped that the Phila- 
delphia Child Guidance Clinic group might now present the study in a way that inde- 
pendent evaluation was possible. 
Hopefully, our review and the reply by Rosman and Baker (1988) will serve to 
encourage family therapists to broaden their reading and thinking about diabetes. 
Readers with some statistical background will be aware that Rosman and Baker did 
not provide an adequate analysis of their data. Correlational analyses utilizing differ- 
ence scores and a sample size of 7 cannot possibly demonstrate the “crossover effect” 
Rosman and Baker claim. In an Appendix to this article, we provide a more detailed 
discussion of statistical issues for the interested reader and renew our request for the 
data that had been promised but not delivered. 
Rosman and Baker also presented a spirited defense of what is now an outdated 
view of the illness and its treatment. Minuchin et al. (1978) had noted that their results 
were limited to families with “psychosomatic diabetes,” and that it was only in this 
group that they claimed support for their hypothesis of psychosomatic disease. Yet, they 
claimed that therapeutic observation with families of patients suffering from other 
illnesses had validated the generalizability of their results (cf. p. 49), and it is this more 
sweeping claim that has obtained the greatest attention. We believe that it is time that 
the field reconsider the adequacy of the concept of a “psychosomatic” diabetic child, 
particularly as it lends credibility to a more general conception of a “psychosomatic 
family.” There are important theoretical implications of such a conception, but we should 
not miss the practical ones. The notion of a “psychosomatic family” can lead a family 
therapist to miss obvious opportunities to assist families in the throes of medical crises 
to change their behavior, related to diabetes and its treatment a t  home. Given these 
concerns, we will go beyond the exchange with Rosman and Baker (1988) and focus our 
discussion on this outdated concept and begin to suggest what a replacement model 
would look like. 
THE RISE AND FALL OF PSYCHOSOMATIC CONCEPTS 
The notion of “psychosomatic” diabetes is not generally accepted in the diabetes 
literature. One can search in vain for a discussion of it in standard textbooks. If the 
term occurs at all, it is typically in quotation marks and limited to discussions of the 
work of the Philadephia group. 
In designating some diabetic patients as “psychosomatic,” Minuchin et al. were 
drawing upon a conception of how psychosocial factors are involved in physical illness, 
that had earlier beeen in vogue, but that had already been rejected by the time the book 
appeared. The basic notion was that sustained emotional upset caused physical illness 
(Alexander, 1950). In the case of diabetes, this idea can be traced as far back as Willis 
(1679, cited in Sunvit, Feinglos & Scovern, 1983). In the early 20th century, psychoso- 
matic theory became wedded to the psychoanalytic movement, and speculation was 
focused on how global personality traits might predispose a person to  react to  stress 
with a somatic response. Minuchin et al. (1978), thus, borrowed a conceptual strategy 
from psychosomatic medicine and took it to a higher level of organization-the family- 
preserving its basic form. 
By the late ’ ~ O S ,  psychosomatic medicine had fallen into disfavor. As Suls and 
Rittenhouse (1987) have noted, the notion of psychosomatic disorders was found t o  have 
too little explanatory and predictive power. While ostensively explaining how arousal 
might contribute to physical illness, psychosomatic concepts failed to explain why only 
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some persons became ill or why illness should take a particular form. People can be 
aroused without becoming ill, and arousal does not necessarily exacerbate the condition 
of persons already ill. The psychosomatic model also failed to explain how psychological 
states might translate into the endocrine abnormalities. The very plausibility of psy- 
chological states translating directly into such abnormalities generally depended upon 
ignorance of identifiable biological pathways. In disease after disease, as more was 
learned about biological processes, psychosomatic explanations declined in influence 
(Dakof & Mendelsohn, 1986). One review, specifically focusing on diabetes, noted, “the 
psychosomatic approach has not been found to be of any practical utility in  helping 
patients and physicians manage the disease . . . Clearly, if psychology is to make a 
meaningful contribution to the understanding and treatment of diabetes, a new approach 
is necessary” (Surwit, Feinglos & Scovern, 1983, p. 256). 
The decline of the influence of psychosomatic concepts was apparent in many ways, 
including the deletion of psychosomatic conditions from the DSM-I11 (American Psy- 
chiatric Association, 1980). Beyond that, accumulated scepticism about the notion of 
psychosomatic disorders had, by the mid-sixties, led to a premature, but widespread 
rejection of any role for psychosocial factors in health (Holroyd & Coyne, 1987). It was 
only with the advent of research concerning stressful life events that the credibility of 
this idea was reestablished, and one can find ample evidence that a credibility gap still 
exists, as in a recent editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine (Angell, 1985). 
The notion that psychosocial factors, and particularly stress, should influence health 
has been revived in health psychology and behavioral medicine. However, many theo- 
rists, clinicians, and researchers now explicitly reject the notion of psychosomatic illness 
as overly simplistic and as placing too much emphasis on unverifiable psychogenic 
factors. Further, it  is no longer assumed that generalized arousal is the only or primary 
means by which stress influences health (Coyne & Holroyd, 1982; Holroyd & Coyne, 
1987). Hypotheses about the role of arousal in susceptibility to illness are more circum- 
scribed and specific, as can be seen in the evolving work examining the association 
between cynical hostility and cardiovascular disease (Demboski & Costa, 1987). Overall, 
the emerging health psychology or biopsychosocial paradigm is a broad one without 
firm boundaries. It does not assume that causal links have to be established in order to 
make psychosocial factors relevant to managing medical conditions, and, therefore, the 
paradigm is not limited to disorders defined as psychophysiological or what used to be 
termed “psychosomatic.” Certainly, one does not have to “rule out” organic factors to 
claim a relevance. Generally, one cannot so easily dismiss such factors. Further, diabetes 
does not have to be “psychosomatic” for psychosocial factors to be crucial in its manage- 
ment. 
Sadly, family therapists have not had much of a role in these developments, and 
the family gets very little attention in health psychology (Dakof, 1987). As an  example, 
one massive text (Stone, Cohen & Adler, 1979) contained only a single entry for the 
family in its index, and that is only for a self-report family assessment inventory. 
Antiquated concepts like the “psychosomatic family” do not serve to encourage a rap- 
prochement. The continued use of this notion by family therapists suggests that  they 
are ill-informed and still holding onto a narrow arousal-based conception of how psy- 
chosocial factors are involved in physical illness that has already been discarded as 
inadequate. 
“PSYCHOSOMATIC” DIABETES 
Rosman and Baker (1988) state that their work encompasses a group of diabetic 
children with repeated DKA, for whom “alternative explanations of poor diabetic man- 
agement or organic causes have been rigorously ruled out’’ (p. 126). Since the work 
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reported in Minuchin et al. (1978) was completed, there have been considerable advances 
in the tools for managing diabetes and in assessing the bases of poor control. Yet, even 
now, ruling out organic factors and poor diabetic management is not as clear-cut as 
Rosman and Baker suggest. A decade after this work, Keen (1985) has stated, “It is not 
easy to devise a diagnostic schema which could be systematically applied to separate 
‘organic,’ explicable cases from the putative ‘psychic’ or behavioural cases” (p. 6). 
Moreover, careful work, focusing on understanding more about very labile diabetes 
in adults (Schade, Drumm, Duckworth & Eaton, 1985; Williams, Pickup & Keen, 1985) 
and in children (Golden, Herrold & On; 1985; White, Kolman, Wexler, Polin & Winter, 
1984), has been conducted since the publication of Psychosomatic Families. In 1989, we 
have the benefit of putting the “relative rarity of the true psychosomatic disorder” 
(Rosman & Baker, 1988, p. 126) in a new, and much broader, perspective. 
While each of the above studies has documented the existence of stressful personal 
and family circumstances in the majority of individuals with very labile diabetes, these 
investigations have also pointed to the contributions of the patient’s behavior to this 
metabolic instability, i.e., to the manipulation of diabetes-related self-care behavior as 
a tactic for coping with stressful life circumstances. As Rizza, Zimmerman & Service, 
(1985) summarize: 
Careful attention must be paid to behavioral aspects of the remaining subset with alleged 
brittle diabetes. It is essential to recognize noncompliance or malingering when it is the 
basis for brittle diabetes to direct efforts to the correction of the aberrant behavior and 
avoid embarking on complex and potentially risky treatment techniques such as chronic 
venous or intraperitoneal insulin delivery, which, in these cases, would be assured of 
failure. (p. 95) 
A model in which arousal is seen as the mechanism causing or mediating repeated 
episodes of DKA distracts family therapists from probing the self-care behavior issues 
which have been documented over and over again to occur in concert with family and 
school-related stresses in children with repeated episodes of DKA. Further, an insistence 
on the necessity of changing the basic family structure thwarts a real investigation of 
the role of self-care behavior in metabolic instability. For example, White et al. (1984) 
describe depression, anxiety and poor self-esteem in children with repeated DKA, but 
admit that they “could not establish to what degree these emotional problems were 
related to their diabetes, their unsatisfactory home situation, or some other factor. 
However, these feelings did influence how the children care for themselves and their 
heal th  (p. 753). It is no simple task to “rule out management problems” (Rosman & 
Baker, 1988, p. 1261, and one need only to read Schade et a1.k (1985) account of the 
exquisite scrutiny needed to uncover the maladaptive self-care behavior in some patients 
with IDDM to appreciate how many resources and how much time must be devoted, in 
some cases, to understanding self-care behavior as interactional tactics. 
Rosman and Baker (1988) identify one of the most significant problems with the 
“psychosomatic diabetic” model early in their reply to our review: “Perhaps what is not 
well understood is the relative rarity of the true psychosomatic disorder” (p. 126). This 
is emphasized again on the last page: “Our model . . . was limited to  a specific and well- 
defined population. If some have erroneously applied the model in a global way to the 
wrong patients, we will criticize them . . .” (p. 13U.l This emphasis on the rarity of the 
condition is indeed new. The Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic group has itself encour- 
aged such “global” applications of their model. For example, one member of this group 
(Sargent, 1985) has recently reported: 
“The goals of family therapy for psychosocial difficulties in diabetes management are to 
1) create new family structures that will promote effective medical treatment, 2) reduce 
the family stress that induces physical symptoms, 3) decrease the role of physical symp- 
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toms in maintaining family stability and 4) assist the family in encouraging appropriate 
autonomy and development of all members, especially the diabetic child” (p. 228). 
Would family therapists who follow this advice and concentrate on reducing “the 
family stress that induces physical symptoms” in families with “psychosocial difficul- 
ties,” and who, therefore, may have missed other important behavioral issues related 
to diabetes self-care, fall under the “criticism” which Rosman and Baker (1988) promise 
for those who apply “the model in a global way to the wrong patients’’ (p. 131)? Sargent 
(1985) discusses “reduction of family stress that induces physical symptoms” as a goal 
for family therapy without any caveat about the rarity of “psychosomatic” diabetes. 
Further, a discussion of a specific case (p. 219) draws a connection between parental 
discord and the child‘s ketoacidosis, but leaves the nature of the connection mysterious. 
Like Rosman and Baker (1988) and Minuchin et al. (19781, Sargent ignores the well- 
established role of inadequate self-care as an interactional tactic in poorly controlled 
diabetes. 
BRITTLE DIABETES AND THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION 
OF FAMILY THERAPISTS 
There has been continuing progress in the medical management of IDDM. Before 
the 1920s, most patients with IDDM died within 2-3 years as a result of severe metabolic 
decompensation (Haycock, 1983). With the introduction of insulin therapy in the early 
twenties, such metabolic decompensation became the exception, and the lives of patients 
with IDDM could be prolonged. By the 198Os, tools such as self-monitoring of blood 
glucose levels, multiple daily insulin injections, and even continuous infusion insulin 
pump therapy insured that increasing numbers of IDDM patients are able to maintain 
near-normal blood sugar levels much of the time. It should be emphasized that although 
the management of diabetes remains challenging, most diabetic children and adoles- 
cents do not now display a disruptive medical course. Indeed, there is much to be learned 
about how so many patients and their families adapt as well as they do. 
Yet, there are identifiable patients who experience a cycle of dysfunction, with 
closely linked medical and interpersonal crises. The term “brittle diabetes” has been 
applied to those few patients who exhibit such severe fluctuations in metabolic control 
that they are unable to maintain a relatively normal lifestyle (Tattersall, 1977; White 
& Santiago, 1985). Unlike “psychosomatic” diabetes, this term is widely accepted and 
meant to be purely descriptive. It is deliberately noncommittal on the question of 
etiology. Appropriately, it does not involve assumptions that the same etiological factors 
operate across cases or that a single etiological factor can explain a particular case. 
Precise definitions of brittle diabetes vary somewhat, and as a result, estimates of its 
prevalence vary. White & Santiago (1985) applied the term to 5% of their young patients 
with IDDM. Apparently using much stricter criteria, Keen (1985) estimated that there 
were only 20 to 30 such patients in the United Kingdom at  any one time. 
As White and Santiago (19851, Keen (1985), Pickup, Home, Bilous, Keen & Alberti, 
(1981) and others characterize their patients with brittle diabetes, they are overwhelm- 
ingly female and adolescents or young adults. There is a close association between the 
onset of brittle diabetes and puberty, among both patients who developed diabetes earlier 
in childhood and those who developed it near puberty (White & Santiago, 1985). There 
are frequently pre-existing family and other psychosocial factors in the lives of these 
patients: economic hardships, single parent homes or overt marital turmoil, overdepen- 
dent relationships, chronic physical illness and psychiatric problems in parents, and 
inability to involve the parents in diabetes care. Yet, as Keen (1985) points out, these 
same problems occur in the backgrounds of many stable diabetic patients. 
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Various biomedical causes of brittle diabetes have been identified, including prob- 
lems with insulin absorption, antibody response to insulin, counter-regulatory hormone 
effects, and the Somogyi phenomenon-a paradoxical reaction to extremely low blood 
sugars. Tattersall and Walford (1985) have suggested that the patient’s behavior is a 
major influence in most cases of brittle diabetes. It is important for family therapists to 
appreciate that biomedical and behavioral causes of brittle diabetes are not mutually 
exclusive, and each may contribute to the evolution of the other. The identification of a 
clear biomedical problem in a particular case does not eliminate the need to examine 
the relevance of both the family context and the patient’s self-care behavior. A patient 
whose first serious bouts of hyperglycemia may be the result of incorrect insulin dosage, 
illness, or faulty insulin absorption may discover how devastating a weapon such a life- 
threatening crisis can be within the family. Further, a patient may deliberately create 
initial metabolic crises, which, in turn, take on a life of their own: 
Escalation of insulin doses, continued cheating and repeated admissions could then create 
a chain of events leading to a state of chronic hyperglycemic instability . . . The instability 
may now be thought of as an “acquired metabolic” problem, though cheating may still 
play a part in some patients at this stage” (Gill, Husband, Walford, Walford, Marshall, 
Home & Alberti, 1985. p. 38). 
Patients can be quite creative in their noncompliant and manipulative behavior, 
and it may take considerable work to detect this, even in a controlled hospital setting. 
Schade et al. (1985) have reported patients injecting insulin surreptitiously to produce 
hypoglycemic seizures, replacing insulin with water, and crimping catheters to cut off 
the flow of intravenous insulin. Medical personnel may have a vague sense that the 
interactional context is relevant to such behavior, just as they are aware that the family 
may be relevant. Yet, what is missing and crucially needed is a framework for under- 
standing the dynamics by which such behavior and the associated medical crises can 
shape relationships and vice versa. Family therapists, thus, have the opportunity to 
develop a framework for explaining how behaviors related to brittle diabetes can evolve 
in a family context, how that context co-evolves with the patient’s behavior, and how 
the behavior of the patient and the rest of the family become mutually maintaining. 
The crucial shift, however, is to viewing self-care behavior and the resulting crises as 
interpersonal tactics, as dynamic efforts to solve problems, define relationships, and 
influence others, even if they are costly and self-defeating. This view must be contex- 
tualized in terms of how others-notably other family members and even medical staff- 
are trying to solve the problems as  they see them and exert an influence on the unfolding 
events. The psychosomatic family model is unlikely to be of much help, and its misplaced 
and overstated emphasis on arousal is a distraction from these tasks. 
Further, family therapists have the opportunity to develop ways of intervening to 
insulate diabetes management and the metabolic stability of the diabetic patient from 
intractable family conditions. The same family conditions that are tied to brittle diabetes 
are likely to be associated with a failure to accept or benefit from conventional family 
therapy Most families with a diabetic child who has repeated medical emergencies will 
reject participation in therapy (Golden, Herrold & Orr, 1985), much less therapy aimed 
at  a fundamental reorganization of family structure. Yet, even when intervention is not 
formally defined as therapy, family therapists can potentially provide valuable consul- 
tation as to how to deal with issues of autonomy and control, and they can encourage 
an appreciation of the interactional significance of both compliance and noncompliance. 
Faced with the life-threatening crises of diabetes, medical personnel and family mem- 
bers alike often fail to appreciate the interpersonal dynamics or problem-maintaining 
solutions in which they have been caught up. 
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In summary, family therapists need a broader-based model if they are to provide an 
adequate understanding of the role of the family in brittle diabetes and other chronic 
illness. In the case of diabetes, such a model would give attention to: (a) individual 
differences in the difficulty in achieving adequate metabolic control, particularly biomedical 
factors; (b) the possibility of control problems as tactics in relationships; (c) the family 
as an open system influenced by how it is engaged by the medical system; and (d) the 
problems of achieving metabolic control in chaotic and otherwise dysfunctional families, 
the effects of poor control on families, and how these effects unfold over time. The first 
step is to  focus on observable sequences, not elusive links between arousal and metab- 
olism. The recognition that family stress and metabolic control problems co-occur should 
be the starting point for developing an understanding of a particular case, not the 
conclusion. 
APPENDIX: THE GAP BETWEEN PROMISE AND DATA 
Minuchin et a1 (1978) claimed to have demonstrated a direct link between observed 
family patterns and individual physiology such that the functional significance of the 
poorly controlled diabetes for the family had been established. To our knowledge, none 
of the observational data have ever been revealed in print. Coyne and Anderson (1988) 
detailed some of the problems of the original presentation of the physiological (free fatty 
acid; FFA) data in Psychosomatic Families. Given the reliance on analyses that do not 
preserve the family as the unit of analysis to argue about family dynamics, and the 
absence of basic descriptive statistics or significance tests, one certainly could doubt as 
to whether the data offered any support at all for the interpretations that the authors 
provided. Rosman and Baker (1988) acknowledge, “It is true that the original presen- 
tation of the data here was not in standard form . . .” (p. 128). The issue is not whether 
Minuchin et a1.k presentation of their data was “standard form,” but whether their data 
in any way supported their claim that they had a “scientific confirmation” of their 
hypotheses. 
Rosman and Baker’s new analyses (1988) have not alleviated this problem. Although 
they renewed the claim of Minuchin et al. (1978) that the function of the patients’ 
symptoms in their families had been demonstrated, yet, a t  best, the new analyses offer 
limited evidence that the patients with “psychosomatic” diabetes were more upset, as 
measured by FFA levels. One could have predicted that from the nature of the crises 
that these patients faced. One might even anticipate that their parents also had elevated 
FFA levels. 
Regardless, by the usual standards of evidence, no support is offered for the view 
that the symptoms of the diabetic patients served a function in their families. As with 
Minuchin et al. (19781, the issue is not one of being picky or of disagreeing on a minor 
technical point, but of there being a major departure from how data are treated and 
interpreted in refereed journals. It appears that claims of neither Rosman and Baker 
(1988) nor Minuchin et al. (1978) are derived from what is available in the data. 
It would be useful to note what analyses would be appropriate and why the new 
analyses shed so little light on what happened in the original study. The study involved 
three small groups of families, each of which consisted of a child, a father, and a mother 
who were observed under four conditions. Appropriate analyses should make as full a 
use of this design as possible, preserving both the relatedness of family members (i.e., 
the family as the unit of analysis) and the fact that it was the same families being 
observed across the four conditions. Ideally, this would be accomplished using a 3 x 3 
x 4 repeated-measure ANOVA with group (normal, behavioral-problem, or “psychoso- 
matic” diabetic patient) as one factor, and family member (child, father, mother) and 
observation period (1,2,3, or 4) as the repeated factors. Most of the interesting and 
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relevant analyses would focus on interactions among these factors. However, such 
analyses would require statistical power to the extent that such a small sample is 
unlikely to afford. Particularly with highly variable physiological data, it is unlikely 
that this small size would provide rejection of the null hypothesis that anticipated 
differences do not occur. 
Instead of ANOVA, Rosman and Baker utilized the Mann-Whitney test in multiple 
efforts to uncover differences among the patients at single points in time. It is a non- 
parametric test that examines whether two distributions are different, not whether 
means (or other central tendencies such as mode or median) of two samples are different. 
This choice of analysis is unfortunate because it suppresses information and can yield 
only ambiguous results. Particularly with such a small sample, one simply does not 
have a basis for concluding from a significant Mann-Whitney U that the FFA levels of 
one group are significantly different from another. Even with a larger number of subjects, 
two samples could have the same mean or modal FFA values and still yield a significant 
value for U because of differences in the distribution of the FFA values. Thus, statisti- 
cally significant results are not necessarily enlightening about whether hypothesized 
differences occur. Again, even if we grant that the groups of patients tended to be 
different, i t  is not clear what support this offers for the strong claims of Minuchin et al. 
(1978) and Rosman and Baker. 
The use of the Mann-Whitney test is understandable even if unsatisfactory, but 
Rosman and Baker’s correlational analyses are more puzzling. First, recall that each 
family had two parents and a child present for the experimental task, thus yielding 
three data points at any single observation. Yet, a correlation coefficent is bivariate in 
nature, and so one parent apparently got dropped from each family, or the data from the 
two parents were somehow combined. In their original presentation of their data, 
Minuchin et al. simply dropped the parent in each family who had the lower FFA value 
(1978, p. 46). Perhaps Rosman and Baker did the same. More than being nonstandard, 
this capitalizes on chance and does not produce an interpretable statistic. Subsequent 
statements about significance become meaningless. 
Second, the correlation coefficent is based on a sample size of 7. This is problematic 
because this statistic is so susceptible to  sample fluctuation and outliers with such a 
small sample. The reader can get a sense of this by arbitrarily graphing a scatterplot of 
7 data points and observing the effects of eliminating or moving any one of them on the 
regression line that best fits the set of them. Generally speaking, one does not attempt 
correlational analyses with such a small sample size. One cannot even adequately 
determine whether the required assumptions for a test of significance are being met. 
A third, and even more serious, difficulty is posed by Rosman and Baker’s reliance 
on change scores. Tackling the issue of how, or even whether, change in a child’s FFA 
levels is related to  changes in parent FFA values requires multiple regression or related 
techniques, which, in turn, require a much larger sample. A standard text, Cohen and 
Cohen (1975), has shown how an approach to correlation such as taken by Rosman and 
Baker (1988) results in a spuriously inflated and otherwise uninterpretable correlation 
coefficent. Cohen and Cohen (1975) go on to show how the kind of results obtained by 
Rosman and Baker are best understood as a failure to control the effects of initial 
differences: Any significant correlation using change scores is likely to be an artifact of 
initial differences in patients’ or parents’ FFA levels, not a crossover effect. Again, the 
issue is not one of being picky, but of a serious departure from the ways in which data 
are typically utilized, analyzed and interpreted. 
A decade after the publication of Psychosomatic Families, we ask, where are the 
data? Minuchin et a1.k (1978) provocative ideas about how families are involved in 
chronic illness have been given a unique status in the field because of the promise that 
they would be substantiated with data showing the role that some “psychosomatic” 
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diabetic children play in their families. Without actually being available for scrutiny, 
these same data have been widely cited as a compelling demonstration that symptoms 
serve functions in families. However, the basis for these claims still has not been 
forthcoming, and Rosman and Baker’s (1988) only weakens their claims that their model 
is data-based. In defending their original work, they infelicitiously adopted the metaphor 
of parents for themselves. Given their rejection of another opportunity to give an 
adequate presentation of the data and given the manner in which they defend a 10- 
year-old model, we feel like we are responding to used-car dealers who insist an old car 
is as good as new, but won’t let us look under the hood. Caveat emptor. 
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